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Abstract Pairwise comparisons (PC) is a well-known method for modeling the subjective
preferences of a decision maker. The method is very often used in the models of voting sys-
tems, social choice theory, decision techniques (such as AHP - Analytic Hierarchy Process)
or multi-agent AI systems. In this approach, a set of paired comparisons is transformed into
one overall ranking of alternatives. Very often, only the results of individual comparisons
are given, whilst the weights (indicators of significance) of the alternatives need to be com-
puted. According to Heuristic Rating Estimation (HRE), the new approach discussed in the
article, besides the results of comparisons, the weights of some alternatives can also be a
priori known. Although HRE uses a similar method to the popular AHP technique to com-
pute the weights of individual alternatives, the solution obtained is not always positive and
real. This article tries to answer the question of when such a correct solution exists. Hence,
the sufficient condition for the existence of a positive and real solution in the HRE approach
is formulated and proven. The influence of inconsistency in the paired comparisons set for
the existence of a solution is also discussed.
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1 Introduction
The ability to compare things is one of the most useful human skills [8]. When comparing
the quality of products in a grocery store, the taste of foods in a restaurant or the fuel prices
at a gas station, people are able to make the best choices. The problem starts when the
list of possible options is too long and none of the options is clearly better than others.
Probably anyone who has visited an electronics store felt slightly uncomfortable looking at
several TVs, at the same time wondering which one is the best. In such a case, the pairwise
comparisons (PC) method [23] may help. According to the method, instead of comparing all
the alternatives (hereinafter referred to as concepts) at once, it is better to compare them in
pairs. Then, knowing the results of each paired comparison, the final priority values for the
considered concept can be calculated. The process of aggregating the results of individual
comparisons into the common ranking list of compared concepts hereinafter will be referred
to as the priority deriving procedure.
The first written evidence of the use of paired comparisons dates back to the thirteenth
century and RamonLlull’s binary election systems [11]. According to Llull, during several
voting rounds, every set of two candidates is compared in a pair and the winner is the one
who wins by a majority in the greatest number of binary1 paired comparisons. The method
was later repeatedly reinvented. Condorcet [12] and Borda [14] proposed it in the second
half of the eighteen century in their voting systems. Thurstone uses the generalized2 pair-
wise comparisons in experimental psychology [44]. Llull’s basic system was then reinvented
(with some minor modifications) by Copeland in the context of welfare economics [11, 13].
The pairwise comparisons method is a cornerstone of AHP (Analytic Hierarchy Process) -
a multi-criteria decision technique [38]. According to AHP, each concept is compared with
each other with respect to different criteria. In this way, each concept receives some ranking
value associated with the given criterion. Then, the criteria are compared with each other.
Hence, every criterion also gets a priority value. The final priority value assigned to the con-
cept is the weighted sum of its criterion’s specific priorities multiplied by priorities of the
criteria [40].
Comparing alternatives in pairs is also widely used in other than AHP multi-criteria deci-
sion making methods such as ELECTRE [16, 19], PROMETHEE [7] or MACBETH [2].
In this study, however, pairwise comparisons have two equally important meanings: ordi-
nal and cardinal. This makes the presented approach similar to AHP rather than ELECTRE
or PROMETHEE. Thus, in this approach, unlike in some models known from the social
choice theory [34, 43] the result of the comparison is a real number representing the relative
value (strength) of the preference. In this sense the PC method as proposed by Thurstone
[44], and then developed by Saaty [38] (hereinafter referred to as the PC method) seems
to be closer to the generalized Arrow’s model proposed by Sen [34, 42] than the earlier
works. On the other hand in the PC method an expert (or a group of experts) is obligated
to provide a matrix containing the results of the comparisons of any two alternatives. This
makes it similar to the paired-comparisons voting rules such as the Kemeny-Young method
or Simpson-Kramer Min-Max rule [33]. Although the PC method usually does not appear
in the debate on the social choice theory it can be useful in this context [41].
1The result of a single paired comparison was binary: 0 or 1. Each element of the pair could be either a
winner or a loser
2In contrast to the binary paired comparisons, the result of a generalized paired comparison was a number
determining the ratio between the relative intensity of two stimuli
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Despite their long history, paired comparisons are still an inspiration and a challenge to
researchers. Examples of their exploration are the approaches based on using rough sets
[22], fuzzy PC relation [35], incomplete PC relation [5, 18, 26], reduction of data inconsis-
tency [28], non-numerical rankings [24], the social choice theory [33], additive PC [27] and
weight effectiveness [3, 4].
A recent contribution to the PC method includes the Heuristic Rating Estimation (HRE)
approach [30, 31] that allows the user to explicitly define a reference set of concepts, for
which the utilities (the ranking values) are known a priori. In HRE, the relative value of a
single non-reference concept is determined as the weighted average of all the other concepts.
Such a proposition leads to the formulation of a linear equation system whose solution, a
vector of weights, determines the desired ordering of concepts. The vector need to be strictly
positive and real. The presented article is the first one which tries to provide the answer
to the question when this vector is positive and real. The resulting outcome (Section 4) is
an intuitive and easy to check criterion ensuring the existence of an admissible solution.
Although the presented criterion is sufficient (but not necessary), it may be useful for a wide
class of problems for which the reference concepts are roughly a bit more than half of all
the objects (see Section 4, Remark 3).
Basic information about the PC method, the M-matrix theory and the HRE method can
be found in Sections 1, 2.3 and 3 correspondingly. The main results of the work includ-
ing an existence condition (Theorem 2) and three additional Remarks on its properties are
presented in Section 4. A brief summary is provided in Section 5.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 The pairwise comparisons method
The pairwise comparisons method is very often used as a technique that allows an
expert (or a group of experts) to synthesize individual pairwise judgments into one,
common ranking. The subject of the rankings can be any tangible or intangible enti-
ties (anything that experts can assess), hereinafter referred to as concepts or alternatives.
Let C
df= {c1, . . . , cn} be a finite set of concepts to be judged and/or analyzed, and
{m1,1, . . . , m1,n, m2,1, . . . , m2,n,m3,1, . . . , mn,n} be the set of expert judgments about each
pair of concepts ci, cj ∈ C. The judgments (preferences) of experts are represented in the
form of real, positive numbers. Thus, assigning a particular value v to mij , expresses an
opinion3 that ci is v times more important than cj . A set of judgments can be conveniently
represented as a PC matrix M = (mij ). Because a comparison of a given concept to itself
may not indicate a predominance of any of the two compared elements (since they are
identical), the diagonal of M contains all ones.
Let us define the function that assigns the value of importance (also referred to as priority,
preference or rank) to every c ∈ C.
Definition 1 The ranking function for C (the ranking of C) is a function μ : C → R+ that
assigns a positive value from R+ to every compared concept.
3Sometimes, to help experts to express their verbal opinions in the form of numbers, different measurement
scales are used. For example, in AHP the judgment values must lie between 1/9 and 9, and each of the values
1/9, 1/8, . . . , 8, 9 has its own well-defined textual representation [38]
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The μ function is usually defined as a vector of weights:
μ
df= [μ(c1), . . . , μ(cn)]T (1)
The values mij and mji represent subjective expert judgments as to the relative impor-
tance, utility or quality indicators of the concepts ci and cj . Thus, according to the best
knowledge of experts, it should hold that μ(ci) = mijμ(cj ). This observation allows us to
define the two properties of the matrix M: reciprocity and consistency.
Definition 2 A matrix M is said to be reciprocal if for every i, j such that 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n
it holds that mij = 1/mji , and M is said to be consistent if for every i, j, k where 1 ≤
i, j, k ≤ n it holds that mij · mjk · mki = 1.
Although the matrix M may be neither reciprocal not consistent [21], still, in most cases
is it assumed that reciprocity is satisfied. Unfortunately, usually M is not consistent. Since
the data in the PC matrix represents the subjective opinions of the experts, they might be
inconsistent. Hence, there may be a triad mij ,mjk,mki of entries in M for which mik ·mkj =
mij . This leads to a situation in which the relative importance of ci with respect to cj can
be determined either as mik · mkj or mij and both ways lead to two different results. In
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AHP - one of the most popular decision making methods [38] is in line with the above
postulate. It advocates users to adopt the principal eigenvector of M as the priority vector,




















where λmax is a principal eigenvalue of M . Due to the Peron-Frobenius theory, when M
is positive, such a real and positive λmax exists [38]. In particular, if M is consistent then
λmax equals n, hence (4) is a weighted arithmetic mean as postulated in (2).
Let us see how the pairwise comparisons method works in practice by providing the
following simple example in which four candidates c1, . . . , c4 apply for the position of
chancellor of some university. In the adopted election scheme, the university senate shall
discuss the submitted applications and then proceed to vote. Then, taking into account the
outcome of voting, the Rector shall select a candidate for the position of chancellor4.
For the purpose of the example, let us assume that during the vote senators evaluate each
of the six pairs (c1, c2), (c1, c2), . . . , (c3, c4) by assigning 1,2 or 3 either to the first or to
4The presented election scheme is quite popular in Poland. See for example (in Polish) Statute of AGH UST
(in Polish), art. 19, par. 2.8, http://regent2.uci.agh.edu.pl/statut/statut-agh.pdf
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the second candidate within the pair. By assigning 1 (to any out of the two in a pair) they
indicate that both candidates are equally preferred. Assigning 2 to a candidate will mean
that he/she is more preferred than the opponent in a pair and, finally, assigning 3 to the
given candidate will mean that he/she is much more preferred than his/her opponent in the
pair. To express intermediate judgments, voters are allowed to use intermediate values. For
example, in order to express the opinion that ci is slightly more preferred than cj a voter
may assign 1.5 to ci . Voter assignments easily translate to the entries of the PC matrix.
Whenever, considering the pair (ci, cj ), the voter vr assigns x to the concept ci , the value
mij is set to x, and correspondingly, mji is set to 1/x.
Judgments expressed during the vote can be stored in the set of PC matrices
M(1), . . . ,M(q) where every matrix M(r) = (m(r)ij ) corresponds to the opinion of one out of
the q voters. The resulting matrices M(1), . . . ,M(q) can be aggregated into one PC matrix










According to (3) the final ranking μ̂ev is obtained as the rescaled principal eigenvector
of M̂ .
For the sake of the simplicity of calculations, let us assume that the voting was held
by the senate committee consisting of three persons s1, s2 and s3. Their votes were written
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1. 1.44 0.794 2.47
0.693 1. 0.794 2.29
1.26 1.26 1. 2.29




The appropriately rescaled eigenvector of M̂ provides the desired ranking vector μ̂ev (see
3).
μ̂ev = [ 0.304 0.248 0.324 0.123 ]T (8)
The winner is the third candidate, whose application gets the highest rank μ̂ev(c3) = 0.324.
Thus, the senators recommend c3 for the position of chancellor.
2.2 Matrix inconsistency
When the matrix M is inconsistent, it is difficult to unambiguously determine the rela-
tive importance of one concept with respect to the other. In particular, it may turn out that
5There are also other ways of aggregating the results in the multiple expert pairwise comparisons method
[15, 17, 20], but the use of a geometric mean of judgments appears to be the most popular
6The values indicated by voters are written in bold
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mijmjk = mik although both mik and mijmjk are equally well suited to determine the rel-
ative importance of ci with reference to ck . Thus, even if we compute the ranking value
μ(ci), the question arises regarding the extent to which it reflects the expert’s actual opin-
ion [39]? This question prompted researchers to define inconsistency (consistency) indices
as methods for measuring the inconsistency of M .
There is a number of different consistency/inconsistency indices [6, 10, 23, 32]. Despite a
few attempts of axiomatization [10, 29], there is no single commonly accepted definition of
an inconsistency index. However, probably all known indices equal 0 for a fully consistent
matrix M , and grow (or at least do not decrease) along with the increase in disturbances of
triads (mij ,mjk,mki) (see Definition 2). Therefore, it is widely accepted that the lower the
inconsistency index, the more consistent the PC matrix, and hence, the more reliable and
trustworthy the results.
In his seminal work [38] Saaty defined the consistency index (CI) with the help of λmax
(the principal eigenvalue of M).
Definition 3 Given a n × n PC matrix M , Saaty’s CI is defined as:
CI (M) = λmax − n
n − 1 (9)
Indeed, since it holds that λmax = n for the fully consistent M , then for such a matrix
CI (M) = 0. Similarly, the more products in the form mijmjkmki that differ from 1, the
higher7 the CI (M) . In most cases, CI (M) < 0.1 is considered as an acceptable level of
inconsistency8. When the inconsistency is too high, the result of the ranking is regarded as
inconclusive.
For the purpose of the rest of the article, the more restrictive Koczkodaj’s inconsistency
















Definition 4 Koczkodaj’s inconsistency index K of n × n and (n > 2) reciprocal matrix
M is equal to






where i = j , j = k and i = k.
It is easy to see that Koczkodaj’s inconsistency index also equals 0 when M is consis-
tent. Similarly, the increase in disturbances of triads (mij ,mjk,mki) ultimately leads to the
increase of K (M). It is assumed that the acceptable threshold of inconsistency, for most
practical applications, is K(M) < 1/3 [28]. A more complete overview of different indices,
including a comparison of these two, can be found in the literature [6, 9].
In the context of the considered example (Section 2.1), the high inconsistency of matri-
ces M(1),M(2),M(3) or M̂ may induce the Rector to make a decision contrary to the
7Some authors argue that the increase is too slow [29]
8The exact procedure for determining the acceptable value of inconsistency can be found the article [38]
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recommendation of the senate committee. Conversely, the low inconsistency of these
matrices is an argument for proceeding in accordance with the indication of the committee.
2.3 M-matrices
The analysis of the HRE method presented in the article requires knowledge of the concept
of the M-matrix [37]. In order to introduce the notion of the M-matrix and its properties,
let us denote MR(n) - the set of n × n matrices over R, MZ(n) - the set of all A =
(aij ) ∈ MR(n) with aij ≤ 0 if i = j and 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n. Moreover, for every matrix
A ∈ MR(n) and vector b ∈ Rn the notation A ≥ 0 and b ≥ 0 will mean that each entry of
A and b is non-negative and neither A nor b equals 0. The spectral radius of A is defined as
ρ(A) = max{|λ| : det(λI − A) = 0}.
Definition 5 An n×n matrix that can be expressed in the form A = sI−B where B = [bij ]
with bij ≥ 0 for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, and s ≥ ρ(B), the maximum of the absolute value of
the eigenvalues of B (i.e., ρ(B) = max
i
|λi |, where λi is an eigenvalue of B), is called an
M-matrix.
In practice, solving many problems in the biological sciences and in the social sciences
can be reduced to problems involving M-matrices [36]. For this reason, M-matrices have
been of interest to researchers for a long time and many of their properties are known.
Following the work of Plemmons [36] some of them are recalled below in the form of
Theorem 1.
Theorem 1 (M-matrix properties) For every A ∈ MZ(n) the following conditions are
equivalent:
1. A is inverse positive. That is, A−1 exists and A−1 ≥ 0
2. A is semi-positive. That is, there exists vector x > 0 with Ax > 0
3. There exists a positive diagonal matrix D such that AD has all positive row sums.
4. A is a non-singular M-matrix
Note that if A is non-singular then A−1 is also non-singular. Thus, the solution of Aμ = b
is A−1b. Moreover for b > 0 and A - M-matrix, due to the theorem above A−1 ≥ 0, the
vector μ also must be strictly positive, i.e., μ = A−1b > 0.
3 Heuristic rating estimation approach
In the eigenvalue based approach [38], the ranking function μ for all the concepts
c ∈ C is initially unknown. Hence, every μ(c) needs to be determined by the prior-
ity deriving procedure. In real life, however, it may turn out that for some concepts the
priority values are known. Sometimes decision makers have extra knowledge about the
group of elements CK ⊆ C that allows them to determine μ(c) for all c ∈ CK in
advance.
For example, let c1, c2 and c3 be goods that company X intends to place on the market,
whilst c4 and c5 have been available for some time in stores. In order to choose the most
profitable and promising product out of c1, . . . , c3, company X wants to calculate the func-
tion μ for c1, c2 and c3. Due to some similarities between c1, . . . , c3 and the pair c4, c5,
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company X wants to include them in the ranking, treating them as a reference. Of course,
it makes no sense to ask experts about how profitable c4 and c5 are. The values μ(c4) and
μ(c5) can be easily determined based on sales reports.
The situation as outlined in this simple example leads to the Heuristic Rating Estima-
tion method (HRE) [30, 31]. The main heuristic of the HRE method assumes that the set of
concepts C is composed of the unknown concepts CU = {c1, . . . , ck} and the known (refer-
ence) concepts CK = {ck+1, . . . , cn}. Of course, only the values μj for c ∈ CU need to be
estimated, whilst the values μ(ci) for ci ∈ CK are considered to be known. The idea behind
the adopted heuristic (2), the same as for the eigenvalue based priority deriving method
(3, 4) with the fully consistent PC matrix, is that for every unknown cj ∈ CU the value
μ(cj ) should be estimated as the arithmetic mean of all the other values μ(ci) multiplied
by the factor mji . Thus, the values μ(ci) for each unknown concept cj ∈ CU are calculated
according to the following formulas:
μ(c1) = 1n−1 (m2,1μ(c2) + . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . +mn,1μ(cn))
μ(c2) = 1n−1 (m1,2μ(c1) + m3,2μ(c3) + . . . + mn,2μ(cn))
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
μ(ck) = 1n−1
(
m1,kμ(c1) + . . . . . . + mk−1,kμ(ck−1)+
+mk+1,kμ(ck+1) + . . . . . . + mn,kμ(cn)
)
(12)
Since the values μ(ck+1), . . . , μ(cn) are known and constant (ck+1, . . . , cn are the reference
concepts), they can be grouped together. Let us denote:
bj = 1
n − 1mk+1,jμ(ck+1) + . . . +
1
n − 1mn,jμ(cn) (13)
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It is worth noting that b > 0, since every bi for i = 1, . . . , k is the sum of strictly positive
components.
Let us consider the following numerical example. In some local election there are 7
seats to be filled in a district council. Elections are conducted in accordance with the rule
“7 best wins”, hence only 7 people with the best election results are chosen to become
members of the district council. Each party (election committee) may nominate any number
of candidates. However, due to the cost of the election campaign, it is important that the
nominated candidates actually have a chance of entering the council. On the other hand,
based on the results of the previous election, it is known that the result of more than 2000
votes per candidate guaranteed a place in the council. Therefore, the parties are faced with
Existence of solution in HRE 113
the difficult task of identifying candidates who have a real chance of gathering at least 2000
votes.
One of the political parties participating in the elections plans to support at most five per-
sons. As, during the inner-party meeting, seven candidates c1, . . . , c7 have been put forward
(including three current members c5, c6 and c7 of the council), the party leadership has to
decide whom to support. For this purpose, the party has hired a group of experts, whose task
is to assess the chance of each candidate by comparing their election chances in pairs. Dur-
ing the meeting, the experts have prepared9 the PC matrix M = (mij ) such that every mij













1 2 4.5 1.5 0.75 1.2 0.9
1
2 1 2 0.7 0.35 0.5 0.4
0.22 12 1 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.2
0.67 1.43 2.5 1 0.4 0.7 0.5
1.33 2.86 5. 2.5 1 30422511
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0.833 2. 3.33 1.43 25113042 1
2511
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Since the current popularity of the party is similar to that during the previous elections,
and it is known that previously c5, c6 and c7 received μ(c5) = 3042, μ(c6) = 2511 and
μ(c7) = 3220 votes correspondingly, then experts do not evaluate the pairs (c5, c6), (c5, c7)
and (c6, c7). Instead, for each i, j = 5, 6, 7 the value μ(ci)/μ(cj ) as mi,j has been adopted.
To estimate the expected number of votes for other candidates the HRE method is used,
where CU = {c1, . . . , c4} and CK = {c5, c6, c7}. The matrix A and the vector b formed
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−0.083 1 −0.33 −0.12
−0.037 −0.083 1 −0.067

















The ranking vector μ as a solution of the equation Aμ = b is as follows:
μ = ( 2661.5 1226.48 643.048 1619.76 )T (18)
Hence, according to the experts, only c1 (with approximately μ(c1) = 2661 votes) may
count on the support of more than 2000 voters. Based on the results of the ranking, the party
leadership decide to nominate the three current members of the district council c5,c6 and c7
who can count on the support of 3042,2511 and 3220 votes correspondingly, and one new
person, c1, who expects to gain about 2661 votes.
4 Inconsistency based condition for the existence of a solution
To receive the ranking estimates in the HRE approach it is enough to solve the linear equa-
tion system Aμ = b. Therefore, on one hand, it is easy to find a solution by using almost
9For the purpose of the example, there is no need to specify how the experts obtained the matrix M . One
of several possible methods [20] involving geometric averaging results provided by each expert has been
presented in the previous example (Section 2.1)
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any mathematical software including Excel®. On the other hand, a solution may not always
exist, as the calculated μ may not always be positive and real. The following reasoning is
an attempt to find an inconsistency related criterion that helps to decide on the existence of
a solution in the HRE approach.
Let us note that the entries of M = (mij ) are always positive as they represent the
comparative opinions of experts. Thus, it holds that M > 0. For the same reason, the matrix
A (14), formed on the basis of M , has positive entries only on the diagonal, i.e., A ∈ MZ(n)
(see Section 2.3). Therefore, proving that A satisfies any of the conditions of Theorem 1,
implies that A is an M-matrix.
The sufficient condition for A to be an M-matrix is formulated with the help of the
inconsistency index K(M) (Definition 4). The paired rankings for which the inconsistency
index is too high are considered as unreliable [38]. Using an inconsistency index simplifies
the evaluation of Aμ = b and enables linking the reliability of expert assessments with the
solution existence problem.
Theorem 2 (On the existence of a solution) The linear equation system Aμ = b introduced
in the HRE approach has exactly one strictly positive solution if
K(M) < 1 − 1 +
√
1 + 4(n − 1)(n − r − 2)
2(n − 1) (19)
where n = |CU ∪ CK | is the number of all the estimated concepts, whilst r = |CK | - is the
number of known concepts and 0 < r ≤ n − 2.
Proof Following Definition 4, the value of Koczkodaj’s inconsistency index K (M), in
short K , means that the maximal inconsistency for some triad mpq,mqr and mpr is K .
Thus, in the case of an arbitrarily chosen triad mik,mkj ,mij it must hold that:















This means that either: mij ≤ mikmkj implies that K ≥ 1 − mijmikmkj , or mikmkj ≤ mij




df= 1 − K (21)
we obtain that mij ≤ mikmkj implies mij ≥ α · mikmkj , and mikmkj ≤ mij implies
1
α
· mikmkj ≥ mij . It is easy to see that 0 ≤ K < 1, thus 0 < α ≤ 1. Thus, both these
assertions lead to the common conclusion:
α · mikmkj ≤ mij ≤ 1
α
mikmkj (22)
for every i, j, k such that 1 ≤ i, j, k ≤ n. This mutual relationship between the entries
of M can be written as the parametric equation mij = t · mikmkj where α ≤ t ≤ 1α . Using













. . . tk−1,k−1mk−1,kmk,k−1 −mk−1,kn−1
− tk,1mk,1






Existence of solution in HRE 115
where α ≤ tij ≤ 1α , for i, j such that 1 ≤ i, j ≤ k − 1 (please note that the last column
remained unchanged). Hence, finally the matrix A can be written as the matrix product



































mk,1 0 · · · 0
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Since both tij and mij are strictly positive, it holds that B ∈ MZ(n). Therefore, due to
the third condition of Theorem 1 with D
df= I , B is a non-singular M-matrix if (and only if)
the sums of the rows of (n − 1)B are positive. In other words, B is an M-matrix if all of the
following inequalities (26) are true:
m1,k(n − 1)t1,1 − m1,k(t1,2 + t1,3 + . . . + t1,k−1 + 1) > 0
m2,k(n − 1)t2,2 − m2,k(t2,1 + t2,3 + . . . + t2,k−1 + 1) > 0
...
(n − 1) − (tk,1 + tk,2 + . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . +tk,k−1) > 0
(26)
Due to the constraints introduced by the inconsistency K(M), the minimal and the max-
imal value of every tij is α and 1α correspondingly. Thus, the inequalities (26) are true if the
following two inequalities are satisfied10:
(n − 1)α > ( 1
α
+ . . . + 1
α︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−r−2
+ 1) and (n − 1) > ( 1
α




where r = n − k is the number of elements in CK . In other words, B is an M-matrix if
the following two conditions are met:
f (α) > 0, where f (α)
df= (n − 1)α2 − α − (n − r − 2) (28)
and
g(α) > 0, where g(α)
df= (n − 1)α − (n − r − 1) (29)
10Let us denote pi(t)
df= mi,k(n − 1)t and qi(t1, . . . , tk−1) df= mi,k(t1 + t2 + . . . + tk−1 + 1) for 0 < i < k.
Since every α < t, ti < 1α , and 0 < α < 1, all but the last inequalities of (26) have a form pi(t) −
qi(t1, . . . , tk−1) > 0. It is easy to see that pi(t) reaches the minimum in the interval α < t < 1α for t = α,
and similarly, qi(t1, . . . , tk−1) is maximal for every ti such that α < ti < 1α when t1 = . . . = tk−1 = 1α .
Thus, the function pi(t) − qi(t1, . . . , tk−1) reaches its minimum for t = α and t1 = . . . = tk−1 = 1α .




pi(α) − qi( 1α , . . . , 1α )
)
> 0, i.e., (n − 1)α −
(




> 0. The same applies to the last
inequality of (26)
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Table 1 The upper bounds for K(M) for which there is a guarantee that A is an M-matrix
0 ≤ K(M) < r = 1 r = 2 r = 3 r = 4 r = 5
n = 3 0.5 - - - -
n = 4 0.232 0.666 - - -
n = 5 0.156 0.359 0.75 - -
n = 6 0.118 0.259 0.441 0.8 -
n = 7 0.095 0.204 0.333 0.5 0.833
By solving f (α) = 0 and choosing the larger root11 we obtain that:
K(M) < 1 − 1 +
√
1 + 4(n − 1)(n − r − 2)
2(n − 1) (30)
whilst the right, linear, inequality g(α) > 0 leads to
K(M) < 1 − (n − r − 1)
(n − 1) (31)
In order to decide which of these criteria are more restrictive and which should therefore
be chosen, the following two cases need to be considered:
(a) r = n − 2
(b) 0 < r ≤ n − 3
When r = n − 2, it is easy to see that f (α) = αg(α). Thus, both functions f (α) and g(α)
take the 0 value for the same values of argument α. Hence, both criteria are equivalent.
If 0 < r ≤ n−3, it is easy to prove (see Appendix A) that the first condition (30) is more
restrictive than the second one, i.e., whenever (30) holds, the inequality (31) is also true. In
other words, to provide a guarantee that B is an M-matrix, it is enough to consider the more
restrictive condition (30).
The fact that B is an M-matrix implies that there is an inverse matrix B−1 ≥ 0 (Theorem
1). Hence, due to the form of the matrix C, it is easy to see that the inverse matrix C−1 exists,
thus A−1 exists and A−1 = C−1B−1 ≥ 0. Thus, due to the first condition of Theorem 1,
A is an M-matrix, which means that the equation Aμ = b has a unique strictly positive
solution. This conclusion completes the proof of the theorem.
Of course, the theorem proven above does not address the case r = n−1. This is because
r = n−1 implies A is a scalar, hence solving Aμ = b is trivial. When M is fully consistent,
i.e., K(M) = 0 and α = 1, it is easy to see that both conditions (27) are satisfied. Thus, in
such a case A is an M-matrix, and therefore Aμ = b always has a strictly positive solution.
Several upper bounds for K(M) related to the parameters n and r arising from the above
theorem are gathered in Table 1. In a broader range, the relationship between n, r and K(M)
is shown in (Fig. 1).
Remark 1 Let us note that for any combination of r, n ∈ N+ where 0 < r ≤ n − 2, the
right side of (30) is greater than 0. In other words, for a sufficiently low inconsistency, the
equation Aμ = b always has a feasible solution.
11The smaller root 1−
√
1+4(n−1)(n−r−2)
2(n−1) ≤ 0 for any n = 3, 4 . . . and 0 < r ≤ n − 2, so it does not need to
be taken into account












Fig. 1 Limit values of K(M) below which there is a guarantee that the HRE method has a solution
To prove this (see 30) it is enough to show that for n = 3, 4, . . . it holds that:
(
1 + √1 + 4(n − 1)(n − r − 2))
2(n − 1) < 1 (32)
Since
√
1 + 4(n − 1)(n − r − 2) ≤ √1 + 4(n − 1)(n − 3), it is enough to show
(
1 + √1 + 4(n − 1)(n − 3))
2(n − 1) < 1 (33)
Thus, √
1 + 4(n − 1)(n − 3) < 2n − 3 (34)
and
4(n − 1)(n − 3) < (2n − 3)2 − 1 (35)
which is equivalent to
4(n − 1)(n − 3) < 4(n − 1)(n − 2) (36)
Thus, for every n > 1 the above equation reduces to:
n − 3 < n − 2 (37)
The last inequality is always satisfied, which proves that (32) is true for n ≥ 3.
Remark 2 Another interesting observation is that the proof of Theorem 2 takes into account
only those entries of the matrix M that form the matrix A. Hence, there is no need to analyze
the inconsistency for the whole matrix M . Instead, it is enough to analyze M˜ - the matrix
obtained from M by removing rows and columns corresponding to the elements from the
set of known concepts CK . It also holds12 that K (M˜) ≤ K (M). Thus, it may turn out that
the inconsistency of M˜ meets the condition (30), whilst the inconsistency of M is too high.
12By definition of the Koczkodaj inconsistency index, K (M) is the maximum of TM = {κi,j,r such that 1 ≤
i, j, r ≤ n} . Similarly, K (M˜) is the maximum of TM˜ = {κi,j,r such that 1 ≤ i, j, r ≤ k}, where k is the
number of elements in CU . Since k < n thus, also TM˜ ⊆ TM . This implies that max TM˜ ≤ max TM , which
leads to the observation that K (M˜) ≤ K (M)
118 K. Kułakowski
Table 2 The values of r that guarantee the existence of a solution in the HRE approach providing that
K(M) < 1/3
n 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
r ≥ 2 2 3 3 4 5 5 6 6
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It might be noticed that, assuming α
df= 1 − K (M˜) in (21), the proof of Theorem 2 does
not change. Hence, instead of exploring the inconsistency of M it is sufficient to examine
the inconsistency of the reduced matrix M˜ . Thereby, the upper bounds given in the Table 1
can be applied to K (M˜) instead of K (M).
Remark 3 For most practical applications, Koczkodaj’s inconsistency lower than 1/3 is rec-




< 1 − 1 +
√
1 + 4(n − 1)(n − r − 2)
2(n − 1) (39)
which is equivalent to
r > h(n), where h(n)
df= n − 2 − (4(n − 1) − 3)
2 − 9
36(n − 1) (40)
Hence, for the given n ≥ 3 and K(M) < 1/3, it is easy to compute how many known
concepts guarantee the existence of a solution (Table 2).
In particular, in the example of the district council elections in Section 3, the incon-
sistency of the PC matrix (16) is K(M) ≈ 0.308 < 1/3. Since three out of the seven
considered candidates have known ranking values, thus, according to the criterion (19), the








Thus, whenever Koczkodaj’s inconsistency index K(M) is lower than 1/3 (i.e., inconsis-
tency is considered as acceptable) the solution always exists if the known concepts are at
least 55.56% of all the ranked concepts.
5 Summary
The reliability of the results achieved in the PC models are inseparably linked to the degree
of inconsistency of the input data [38]. The lower the inconsistency the better and more reli-
able the results might be expected to be. Therefore, most practical applications of the PC
method method seek to construct the PC matrix with the smallest possible inconsistency.
The theorem proven in this article is in line with the tendency to seek PC solutions with
low inconsistency. It shows that for an appropriately small inconsistency K(M) the recently
Existence of solution in HRE 119
proposed HRE method always has an admissible solution. Moreover, given that the inconsis-
tency is acceptable, i.e., K(M) < 1/3, 55.56 % or more of the known concepts guarantees
the existence of a solution. This observation makes the provided criterion especially useful
in situations where there are many known concepts.
The HRE approach is a relatively new estimation method of the relative order of concepts
when a non-empty reference subset of concepts exists. The properties of this method are
not yet fully understood. Thus, it requires further studies. The presented considerations
are accompanied by two numerical examples demonstrating how the PC method and HRE
can be used in different situations. Due to the possibility of applying the HRE method to
solve various decision problems, it may be of interest to a wide range of researchers and
practitioners.
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Appendix A: Remark about the Restrictiveness of the Criteria
Assuming that n − 3 ≥ r > 0 (i.e., n − 2 > r > 0) the criterion given as (30) is said to be
more restrictive than the criterion given as (31), when the right side of (30) is smaller than
the right side of (31), i.e., when:
1 − 1 +
√
1 + 4(n − 1)(n − r − 2)
2(n − 1) < 1 −
(n − r − 1)
(n − 1) (42)
The above inequality is true if and only if
1 + √1 + 4(n − 1)(n − r − 2)
2(n − 1) >
(n − r − 1)
(n − 1) (43)
Let us denote m
df= n − 1, then (43) is equivalent to:






Since m > 0, thus the above expression is equivalent to:
1 + √1 + 4m(m − r − 1) > 2(m − r) (45)
and consequently
√
1 + 4m(m − r − 1) > 2
(




The above inequality holds if and only if






















1 + 4m2 − 4mr − 4m > 4m2 − 8mr − 4m + 4r2 + 4r + 1 (49)
The above expression is equivalent to:
mr > (r + 1)r (50)
which corresponds to
m − 1 > r (51)
In the light of the assumptions that n−2 > r and the fact that m = n−1 the inequality (51)
is always met. Since, all the expressions (42) - (51) are equivalent the truth of (51) means
that the criterion (30) is more restrictive than the criterion (31).
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